On 16th September 1944 at the Wolf’s Lair daily Fuehrer conference in East Prussia Adolph Hitler suddenly interrupted Generaloberst Alfred Jodl's report on German forces withdrawal from southern France. There ensued a few minutes of strained silence. Then Hitler spoke “I have just made a momentous decision. I shall go over to the counter attack, that is to say” – as he pointed to the map on the desk before him- “here, out of the Ardennes, with the objective- Antwerp.” While his audience sat in stunned silence he began to outline his plan. The scheme visualized for November, no matter how vague its shape in September, was that of a counteroffensive designed to wrest the initiative from the enemy in pursuance of a major strategic victory.

Details of the plan

Field Marshals Rundstedt and Model believed Hitler’s plan to be too ambitious and argued in favour of an alternative plan named the Small solution which involved the envelopment of the enemy east of the Meuse River. On 26th November Jodl visited Ob West Headquarters, only to find that Rundstedt and Model were determined in favour of the Small Solution. Hitler’s response was “There will be absolutely no change in the present intentions.”  Model then brought out the commanders of Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies both supporters of the Small Solution. Hitler refused to budge. In the final version of the operations order for the counteroffensive, Hitler’s original plan prevailed.

Click to see larger View of The Plan

The main effort would be made by Dietrich’s Sixth Panzer Army on the north wing, with orders to cross the Meuse on both sides of Liége, wheel north, and strike for the Albert canal, fanning out the while to form a front extending from Maastricht to Antwerp. Two special operations Grief and Stösser were designed to support Hitler’s crony Dietrich.

Manteuffel’s Fifth Panzer Army, initially acting as the center, had the mission of crossing the Meuse to the south of the Sixth, but because the river angled away to the southwest might be expected to cross a few hours later than its armored partner on the right. Once across the Meuse, Manteuffel had the mission of preventing an Allied counterattack against Dietrich’s left and rear by holding the line Antwerp-Brussels-Namur-Dinant.

Brandenberger’s Seventh Army composed of infantry and mechanized divisions , had orders to push to the Meuse, unwinding a cordon of infantry and artillery facing south and southwest, thereafter anchoring the southern German flank on the angle formed by the Semois and the Meuse. Also Hitler expressed the wish that the first segment of the Seventh Army cordon be pushed as far south as Luxembourg City if possible.

Dietrich’s Sixth Panzer Army, selected to make the main effort, had a distinct political complexion. Its armored divisions all belonged to the Waffen SS and its commander was an old party member. Hitler’s early plans speak of the Sixth SS Panzer Army, although on 16 December the army still did not bear the SS appellation in any official way. It is also clear that the Sixth was accorded the responsibility and honor of the main effort because Hitler felt he could depend on the SS.